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ABSTRACT: Globally, groundwater overdraft poses significant challenges to agricultural production. As a result, it 
is likely that new water management policies and governance arrangements will be needed to stop groundwater 
depletion and maintain agricultural viability. Drawing on interviews with state and non-state water managers and 
other water actors, this paper provides a study of a recent resource management agreement between surface 
water and groundwater irrigators in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer region of Idaho. Using adaptive governance 
as our descriptive framework, we examine how groundwater governance arrangements emerge and are applied 
to mitigate the impacts of groundwater overdraft. Our findings suggest that adaptive governance, while not a 
stated goal of the agreement, may enable flexible and sustainable social and ecological outcomes. Our findings 
also indicate that this new governance arrangement creates a vacuum in enforcement authority that may prove 
challenging as the management agreement is implemented. These findings extend our understanding of the 
conditions necessary for effective adaptive governance of groundwater resources, and highlight the challenge of 
creating capacity for local resource managers as governance shifts from more bureaucratic to adaptive and 
decentralised arrangements. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Globally, groundwater overdraft poses significant challenges to agricultural production (Wada et al., 
2010; Gleeson et al., 2012). As climate change alters existing patterns of precipitation and snowpack 
melt, and exacerbates the stresses already faced by groundwater-dependent agricultural economies, it 
is likely that new water management policies and governance arrangements will be needed to stop 
groundwater depletion and maintain agricultural viability (Melillo et al., 2014; Horangic et al., 2016; 
Hoogesteger and Wester, 2017). Building on the extensive literature examining how surface water is 
governed, a growing body of research has sought to define groundwater governance and to analyse the 
processes that shape groundwater governance arrangements and outcomes around the world (Megdal 
et al., 2017; Villholth et al., 2018). Within this literature, researchers have recently evaluated how 
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elements of groundwater governance, such as stakeholder engagement and regional collaboration 
(Hussein, 2018; Megdal et al., 2017), institutional design (Kiparsky et al., 2017; Varady et al., 2016), the 
availability of and access to information, economic and regulatory frameworks (Varady et al., 2016), 
and adaptive governance (Susskind, 2005) shape the ability of water system actors such as 
governments, managers, and users to solve groundwater problems through policy change. While this 
literature has provided important insights into how groundwater governance enables or inhibits the 
development and application of innovative policy solutions to mitigate the impacts of declining 
groundwater, few empirical case studies document how these processes play out in large-scale 
industrial groundwater-dependent agricultural systems. Further, little research has examined the 
application of adaptive governance principles in shaping policymaking processes and outcomes in these 
same groundwater-dependent agricultural systems. Within this research context, recent groundwater 
policy changes in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (ESPA) region of Idaho, which were designed to 
recharge a depleting aquifer and ensure irrigation water access for farmers in the region, provide an 
important opportunity to analyse the relationship between groundwater governance and the 
development of policies designed to adapt to changing groundwater availability. 
Agriculture in the ESPA region relies on declining aquifer resources for agricultural production. In 
2015, after 20 years of extensive litigation between surface water and groundwater irrigators, these 
two parties negotiated an agreement that led to a new policy, which requires groundwater irrigators to 
reduce their groundwater withdrawals by an average of 13%. Known as the 2015 Settlement 
Agreement, this policy change was designed to ensure that surface water users downstream of the 
aquifer received their full water rights and to implement a managed aquifer recharge program to 
replenish the ESPA. In this paper, we draw on interviews with water managers and other actors 
involved in the 2015 Settlement Agreement to answer the following research questions: 1) how did the 
groundwater governance arrangements in the ESPA region shape the emergence and design of the 
2015 Settlement Agreement, and 2) how did the new governance arrangements affect the 
implementation of the agreement. 
Our analysis expands the growing literature on groundwater governance in two key ways. First, we 
use Susskind’s (2005) prescriptive framework for achieving adaptive governance in groundwater 
systems, to provide a lens for analysing our interview results. We examine how groundwater 
governance arrangements emerge and are applied to mitigate the impact of groundwater overdraft, 
offering insights on where our own results diverged from Susskind’s, and, when possible, why they 
diverged. Second, and in contrast to much of the literature on adaptive governance, we go beyond 
assuming that the application of adaptive governance arrangements will confer on its constituents the 
capacity to act, and briefly assess how the governance arrangements put in place by the 2015 
Settlement Agreement influence the local implementation of the policy solution. In the next section, we 
provide a short review of the literature on groundwater and water governance, with particular 
attention to describing the adaptive governance framework that guides our analysis and discussion of 
our results. This is followed by an overview of our study site and a description of the 2015 Settlement 
Agreement. We then describe our methods, before moving on to our results and discussion. In 
particular, we demonstrate how the governance arrangements underlying the settlement agreement 
enabled flexible and potentially sustainable social and ecological outcomes. We also consider how the 
policy solution that emerged from the settlement agreement negotiations created a vacuum in 
enforcement authority. We finish with a brief conclusion that summarises the paper and explains how 
our findings extend our understanding of the conditions required for adaptive governance. We also 
identify decentralisation of authority and the attendant lack of capacity of local resource managers to 
implement policy, as potential mediating challenges in the shift to adaptive governance arrangements. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Groundwater governance is defined in our study as "the overarching framework of groundwater use 
laws, regulations, and customs, as well as the processes of engaging the public sector, the private 
sector, and civil society" (Megdal et al., 2015: 678). How groundwater governance systems are designed 
is critical to their effectiveness (Kiparsky et al., 2017), and how governance systems are implemented 
sets the parameters that determine how groundwater resources get managed (Megdal et al., 2017). In 
particular, governance arrangements affect the processes through which groundwater problems such 
as aquifer decline are addressed, and the capacity of groundwater managers and other actors to 
adaptively solve problems. The design of a groundwater governance system mediates both how 
adaptive decisions are made and how management actions are implemented and enforced to ensure 
compliance with new policies (Kiparsky et al., 2017). In particular, research has found that in order for 
adaptive problem-solving to occur, it is essential that groundwater management agencies have 
adequate jurisdictional authority and can implement new policies and management activities (Ostrom, 
2005; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012; Kiparsky et al., 2017). 
In the broader literature on resource management, adaptive governance is frequently considered to 
be the ideal strategy for management of scarce resources such as groundwater. Adaptive governance is 
generally characterised as the development of "new governance institutions capable of generating 
long-term, sustainable policy solutions to wicked problems through coordinated efforts involving 
previously independent systems of users, knowledge, authorities, and organized interests" (Scholz and 
Stiftel, 2005, cited in Chaffin et al., 2014). The goals of adaptive governance include developing and 
strengthening relationships between government organisations at multiple scales, and allowing for 
decision-making power to be distributed between different governmental and non-governmental 
organisations. In order for adaptive governance to work, however, an overarching set of rules and 
norms must be agreed upon and established (Ostrom et al., 1961; Susskind, 2005; Ostrom, 2010; Pahl-
Wostl and Knieper, 2014). If rules and norms are not established and recognised by all parties, the 
system is more likely to be fragmented and ineffectively coordinated, particularly if authority is not 
centralised to some degree (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012; Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014; Morris and de Loë, 
2016). When well designed, adaptive governance may lead to increased knowledge and responsiveness 
in the face of risk, and allow for greater flexibility in addressing environmental problems that are being 
managed at different levels, including by individuals who are concerned with their own needs and 
resource use (Childs et al., 2013; Scott et al., 2013; Gillet et al., 2014; Risvoll et al., 2014; Kirchoff and 
Dilling, 2016). While research on adaptive governance has provided important insights into how 
particular forms of governance can enable flexibility and responsiveness in the face of environmental 
change or other forms of risk, it has largely been assumed that application of the principles of adaptive 
governance will themselves confer the capacity to implement and enforce policy solutions on non-state 
and other actors, rather than providing a mechanism for ensuring that capacity exists, or working to 
create it. This assumption has led to a disproportionate focus on the conditions that allow for state and 
non-state actors to engage in policymaking processes, at the expense of focusing on the outcomes of 
the subsequent policies. 
Susskind (2005) identified four minimum conditions for effective adaptive governance of 
groundwater systems. First, he suggests that decision making about water use that affects competing 
parties must include stakeholders and elected and/or appointed representatives who are appropriately 
selected and adequately prepared. If this condition of representation is not met, these decision-makers 
may not be considered legitimate representatives of those who will be affected, and thus it is likely that 
a new policy developed under these conditions would be rejected. Second, for the process to be 
considered legitimate, stakeholders need to have access to the scientific and technical information 
informing decisions, and need to be able to interact directly with decision-makers. Third, neutral 
facilitators selected by the competing parties should run negotiation processes using a consensus-
oriented approach. Finally, areas of disagreement between the competing parties should be defined, 
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and experimentation and collaborative monitoring should be used to resolve disagreements and deal 
with scientific uncertainty. 
While there are other adaptive governance frameworks (e.g. Ostrom, 2005; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007), 
here we use Susskind’s framework as the organising and analytical architecture for our analysis. In 
particular, we assess whether each of Susskind’s four conditions is present in our case, and to what 
extent they contribute to effective implementation of the settlement agreement. Susskind’s framework 
is particularly relevant to our case because it was developed in the United States in response to 
groundwater issues in Florida. Thus, our analysis is an important opportunity to assess the relevance of 
this framework to another case of groundwater governance in the US, and to identify any potential 
extensions or improvements to it. While the settlement agreement’s signatories did not explicitly set 
out to implement an adaptive governance system in the ESPA, the four elements of adaptive 
governance reviewed here were present to various degrees in the process that led to the agreement. 
Moreover, and keeping with our critique of the adaptive capacity literature above, using Susskind’s 
framework (which is largely focused on the conditions that enable adaptive governance to be achieved) 
allows us to demonstrate the problematic consequences of ignoring the policy-implementation capacity 
created (or not created) by governance arrangements. Thus, using these elements as an organising 
framework to guide our analysis helps us understand the factors that shaped the emergence, design, 
and application of the 2015 Settlement Agreement. 
STUDY SITE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BACKGROUND 
Agriculture in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer Region 
Idaho is a major contributor to the global agricultural market, with four million acres of irrigated land 
supporting a US$15 billion agricultural industry (Watson and Ringwood, 2016). Within the United 
States, Idaho is the number one producer of potatoes and barley, and is the second-largest producer of 
sugar beets (ibid). These crops, along with alfalfa and wheat, form the mainstay of Idaho’s agricultural 
production. Additionally, Idaho has a growing dairy industry, which is often supported by, and 
contributes to, the crop market in Idaho. In total, the agricultural industry contributes 16% of value 
added to Idaho’s gross state product (ibid). Much of this production occurs within the ESPA, where 33% 
of the potatoes, 20% of the sugar beets, and 10% of the wheat in the United States is produced on 1.6 
million acres (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2014). Given the continental and global importance of 
Idaho’s agricultural system, changes in water governance have potential ramifications for global 
commodity markets. 
Irrigated agriculture in the ESPA region is accomplished through both groundwater and surface 
water withdrawals, with farmers south of Magic Valley and North Snake Ground Water Districts solely 
dependent on surface water from the Snake River, and farmers in the ten groundwater districts north 
and east of the Twin Falls area dependent on a combination of groundwater from the aquifer and 
surface water from the Snake River (see Figure 1). Importantly, these two water sources are 
hydrologically connected, and surface water availability from the Snake River south of Twin Falls is 
partly determined by the amount of water leaving the aquifer at Thousand Springs. While farmers in 
the region originally depended on surface water resources from the Snake River and its tributaries to 
irrigate their crops (Jones, 2016), rural electrification, the cheap price of electricity, and technological 
advances in well and irrigation technologies allowed farmers to begin pumping groundwater from the 
Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer starting in the 1950s. In addition to ensuring a reliable source of water, 
these advances allowed for 700,000 acres of agricultural land to be put into production in areas north 
and east of Twin Falls between about 1950 and the mid-2000s. While many farmers have maintained 
surface water rights in addition to their groundwater rights, reliance on groundwater in this area 
became the norm, and some farmers now rely solely on it for irrigation. 
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Figure 1. The boundaries of the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer and the eight groundwater districts 
involved in the 2015 Settlement Agreement (Image courtesy of the Idaho Department of 
Water Resources). 
 
Figure 2. ESPA Volume of Water and Thousand Springs Discharge. The artificial inflation and subsequent 
decline of the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer as a result first of flood irrigation and second of 
increased irrigation efficiency (Image courtesy of Idaho Department of Water Resources). 
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As farmers increased the area in agricultural production and relied more heavily on groundwater, 
they also moved towards using more efficient irrigation technology to conserve water resources and 
lower their power bills (Huffaker et al., 2000). These changes decreased incidental recharge levels in the 
ESPA, which led to falling water levels (see Figure 2). As such, farmers and other users today have 
approximately 13 million acre-feet (MAF) (around 16 Bm3) less water available in the aquifer than in 
1952. By the mid-1990s, the decline in the aquifer led to water delivery calls and subsequent litigation 
between surface water users and groundwater users, gradually over the subsequent 20 years changing 
how water was governed along the ESPA. By 2015, surface water and groundwater users recognised 
that litigation was no longer enough to ensure water access and security for both parties. By 2016, 
approximately 30% of agriculture in the ESPA region was being irrigated with groundwater, and, overall, 
the rate of groundwater use is typical of industrialised nations (Idaho Department of Water Resources, 
2016; Idaho National Laboratory Oversight and Radiation Control Program: Idaho Department of 
Environmental Quality, 2005; National Groundwater Association, 2016). 
Background and settlement agreement description 
As in much of the American West, the doctrine of prior appropriation was chosen to regulate irrigation 
water when agriculture in Idaho started expanding rapidly in the early 1900s (Harrington, 2012; Jones, 
2016; Leonard and Libecap, 2017). Prior appropriation allocates water to water rights holders using a 
priority system that dictates which users receive water first in times of scarcity. It is based on the 
principle of 'first in time, first in right'. In this regulatory system, irrigators are issued usufruct water 
rights by the state, each of which has a priority date and allows the withdrawal of a specified amount of 
water from a particular source over a certain time period. The priority date associated with each right 
establishes that right’s position within the overall hierarchy of the region’s water rights. In times when 
there is insufficient water for all water rights to be met, water access is curtailed starting with the most 
junior right so that senior rights are ensured to receive their allocated water. Both surface and 
groundwater rights in Idaho are allocated according the doctrine of prior appropriation. 
While many farmers perceive prior appropriation as a decentralised management strategy that 
grants a private property right to farmers, from a legal perspective, prior appropriation is a centralised 
approach that allows state water managers to issue water rights, address shortages, and manage 
delivery calls (Harrington, 2012). In Idaho, the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) is the 
governing body in charge of managing water throughout the state. Indeed, over the last two decades, 
IDWR implemented an extensive adjudication process to ensure that water rights are clearly issued, 
managed, and recognised across the state, ensuring that priority is always honoured (Fereday and 
Creamer, 2010; Idaho Department of Water Resources, 2014). In addition to delineating the water 
available for agricultural use, this water adjudication process also sought to guarantee sufficient water 
to keep the state’s large hydropower generation plant operational. 
Between 1994 and 1995, IDWR and the state legislature recognised that groundwater and surface 
water resources were hydrologically connected, leading to the implementation of conjunctive 
management to address potential shortfalls experienced by surface water users below the American 
Falls reservoir. Conjunctive management put in place a series of new rules that meant that water rights 
from hydrologically connected ground and surface water sources would be administered together, and 
that junior groundwater users would now be subject to delivery calls from senior surface water rights 
holders in cases where material injury could be shown under the rules of prior appropriation. 
Importantly, the application of conjunctive management accomplished two significant things that set 
the stage for later developments in water management in Idaho. First, it recognised the hydrological 
connectivity of these two formerly separately regulated water resources, meaning that any new policies 
would have to take into account both types of water. Second, it established a means for filing water 
delivery claims against upstream users (who are mostly junior), many of whom primarily rely on 
groundwater pumping. By establishing conjunctive management as the new framework for governing 
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water along the ESPA, IDWR encouraged the creation of four original groundwater districts (now a total 
of ten groundwater districts), each of which could work independently to recharge the aquifer to 
prevent delivery calls, and organise their constituents to use less water overall (Idaho Department of 
Water Resources, 1997). 
While conjunctive management was the first formal change affecting the relationship between 
surface water and groundwater users, additional changes followed. In 2005, Rangen Inc., a fish hatchery 
near Twin Falls, made a water delivery call against groundwater users northeast of American Falls 
reservoir because the hatchery had not received its full allotment of water to operate the fish farm. This 
call and its aftermath established two important precedents that would later influence the 2015 
Settlement Agreement. First, the judicial decision that was made in order to rectify the Rangen call set a 
precedent for the Idaho Groundwater Appropriators (IGWA) to buy and deliver water to surface water 
users downstream so as to ensure that senior water rights holders received their full share, even when 
their normal delivery system failed (Idaho Department of Water Resources, 2005). This decision 
became especially significant as the buying and delivery of water during times of scarcity became a 
particularly important tool over the next ten years. It also established the 'futile call doctrine', which 
dictates that, in order to require groundwater pumpers to shut off their pumps to satisfy a water call, 
this unused water must reach the surface water user in a "reasonable amount of time", which is usually 
considered to be within two weeks (Idaho Department of Water Resources, n.d.). If the curtailed water 
does not augment water sources available for use by the theoretically injured parties within that period 
of time, it is considered a futile call and the groundwater user is not further required to reduce their 
water usage. 
Then, in 2015, after twenty years of gradual change to Idaho’s water governance and repeated 
water calls made against junior groundwater rights holders, a crisis event occurred that catalysed major 
institutional change in Idaho’s groundwater governance. After a dry winter, IDWR issued a report 
indicating that water levels in the ESPA were very low and that up to 300,000 acres of irrigated 
agriculture could face total curtailment by July. In order to avoid a devastating blow to farmers and to 
Idaho’s economy, members of the state legislature met with IDWR hydrologists and consultants, along 
with lawyers and members of the Surface Water Coalition (SWC) and IGWA, to determine a solution. 
The goal of these meetings was to determine how to manage the aquifer for current and future use. 
Extensive negotiation and debate ensued, ultimately leading to the 2015 Settlement Agreement, which 
went into effect in 2016. The agreement stipulates that groundwater districts must reduce their 
groundwater pumping by 240,000 acre-feet (AF), or approximately 13%. While the SWC is not allowed 
to make delivery calls between the start of irrigation season in 2016 and the end of irrigation season in 
2018, IGWA is responsible for leasing 50,000 AF of storage water to deliver to downstream surface 
water users during that time. The agreement also required all groundwater wells to be metered by the 
start of the 2018 irrigation season. Finally, to meet one of IGWA’s primary demands, the agreement 
included managed recharge, meaning that groundwater districts were able to pay for and develop 
recharge sites to offset some of the necessary reductions. Recharge responsibilities were also allocated 
to the state, with the state legislature promising money to the Idaho Water Resource Board (IWRB) in 
order to recharge 250,000 AF of water each year. 
The terms of the settlement agreement also affected groundwater governance at the local level by 
giving groundwater district managers some autonomy in how the agreement would be implemented in 
each district. Using the overall percentage reduction requirement as a guideline, each groundwater 
district was allowed to allocate specific reductions between different water rights holders and to 
monitor compliance however they chose. Most districts developed a tiered system that requires 
farmers to cut their groundwater withdrawals by certain percentages depending on the seniority of the 
water right. Some other districts required that farmers with the historically highest pattern of use 
reduce the most. The agreement went into effect in 2016, and will be re-examined and potentially 
renegotiated in 2020 depending on the ESPA levels. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
The primary data we analyse in this paper comes from 27 interviews conducted during 2017 and 2018 
with water managers, scientists, lawyers, legislators, and other authorities involved in water 
management in Idaho. Initial respondents were identified through snowball sampling from contacts in 
the community; subsequent water managers were identified from publicly available documents. Local 
groundwater managers, most of whom are also farmers or retired farmers, were interviewed in six of 
the eight signatory groundwater districts. Other water managers included those at the state level. We 
also interviewed lawyers from each side of the negotiations, along with other water authorities 
involved in the negotiations. Using a semi-structured protocol, we asked questions about the 2015 
Settlement Agreement negotiation process. Respondents described key actors involved in the 
negotiations and implementation, the alternatives to the settlement agreement that were discussed, 
their opinion about the necessity of the settlement agreement, and who they considered its major 
beneficiaries. For respondents involved in implementation at the local groundwater district level, we 
also asked questions about the particular practices and systems they were using to implement the 
terms of the agreement, and the amount of latitude they had to make adjustments at the local level 
while still meeting the state’s demands. Respondents were encouraged to introduce additional topics 
important to understanding the emergence, design, and application of the 2015 Settlement Agreement 
that were not covered in the interview guide. Follow-up questions were asked by the interviewer where 
appropriate. 
Interviews were recorded and then transcribed. We managed and analysed transcripts in MAXQDA. 
We analysed interviews using thematic content analysis (Bernard et al., 2016) and coded them using 
both deductive and inductive techniques. Deductive codes were selected from the literature review; in 
particular, we focused on the extent to which the changes to policy brought by the agreement aligned 
with adaptive governance principles (Susskind, 2005). We also assessed the way water managers 
perceived the legitimacy of the negotiations (Scholz and Stiftel, 2005; Susskind, 2005), as well as 
changes to the centralisation of decision making and enforcement authority at the state and local 
levels. Inductive codes emerged throughout multiple iterations of coding (Charmaz, 2014). The 
inductively derived codes primarily included codes about prior appropriation, issues of beneficial use, 
the role of the state in water management, local perceptions of the centralisation and decentralisation 
of water management, and other locally-specific codes related to water use and water management. 
Each interview was coded at the sentence level. The themes and patterns derived are discussed in the 
results and conclusions presented below. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In the following section, we present and discuss results from our study that demonstrate that, while the 
processes that led to the 2015 Settlement Agreement and its implementation were not designed 
around Susskind’s four metrics of adaptive governance, the governance arrangements it incorporates 
mirror elements of adaptive governance. Thus, our presentation of the emergence, design, and 
implementation of the agreement is guided by considerations of its legitimacy of representation, 
redistribution of scientific and technical knowledge, subsequent negotiations by neutral parties, and 
the potential for natural experimentation to resolve previously defined disagreements. Finally, we 
consider how the governance arrangements put in place by the agreement affect its implementation, 
showing how the terms of the new agreement change the distribution of power and authority between 
state and local actors. We contend that this redistribution of authority has generated uncertainties in 
the system with respect to enforcement. 
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Legitimacy of representation 
Water managers from most of the groundwater districts and canal companies, as well as state water 
managers, members of the state legislature, lawyers for each side, and technical consultants were 
present throughout the negotiation process. Groundwater district managers from seven of the eight 
signatory groundwater districts were present at all meetings, as were water managers from major canal 
companies. Because groundwater district members elect these water managers, their presence at the 
negotiations ensured the representation of each district, and also contributed to the legitimacy of the 
negotiations and of the agreement itself. From the state, one water manager and several technical 
consultants contributed advice and scientific information at the negotiation meetings. Additional 
individuals from the state included two state legislators, as well as an attorney for the state who has 
been involved in water rulings in the past. 
Notably absent from the negotiations, however, were the groundwater district board members from 
one of the northern groundwater districts. According to these water managers, they were not invited to 
the negotiations until very late in the process, and their input was not solicited. As this groundwater 
district manager said, 
There was one guy that was principally involved from our area and he’s now not involved at all. He was a 
very good negotiator, very intelligent person. Anyway, he was just really good. But they wouldn’t let him 
into the meetings either. They did that agreement on a closed-door agreement. 
The lack of representation from all groundwater districts indicates that stakeholders were not properly 
prepared, both during the negotiations and as water managers began to implement the agreement in 
their districts. The lack of early representation in the negotiations of some districts produced discord. A 
groundwater district manager from one of those districts told us, 
This upper valley, we weren’t included very much. In the early negotiations, we weren’t included at all. 
Then once they progressed, we were complaining that we weren’t part of it and they invited to us to come 
but they wanted us to be very quiet and sit in the back and not voice our opinion. 
Making a space for dissensus is a crucial element of adaptive governance and, without the opportunity 
to share and resolve alternative opinions, management changes resulting from the agreement will give 
rise to discord and frustration. This is often because there is a lack of institutional knowledge but also 
because incomplete representation undermines the legitimacy of agreements. 
After the 2015 agreement was signed and information was being distributed to stakeholders within 
each of the eight signatory groundwater districts, groundwater district managers held meetings to 
communicate information about the agreement to the farmers in their respective districts. Members of 
IDWR and the state legislature often attended these meetings, not only to give legitimacy to the 
agreement itself, but also to serve as a scapegoat for the frustration of farmers in each district. This 
allowed groundwater district managers to maintain their own legitimacy and good standing within the 
eyes of their community. 
Redistribution of scientific and technical knowledge 
Susskind argues that scientific and technical knowledge is a key feature of adaptive governance, and 
that the redistribution of this knowledge must be done by experts selected by stakeholders. Water 
managers at the state and local level involved in Idaho’s 2015 Settlement Agreement seemed to agree 
with this sentiment, arguing that the agreement could not have been negotiated without their having 
access to aquifer-level data and modelling that allowed them to explain to their constituents the level 
to which the aquifer had declined. In addition, throughout the process, representatives of the IDWR 
attended groundwater district meetings to help distribute knowledge of the aquifer model and the 
associated terms of the agreement. While irrigators knew that the aquifer had been declining, the 
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updated hydrological and technological information IDWR provided during the negotiations helped 
local water managers accept the implications of the aquifer decline. As a member of IDWR noted, "I 
think it was important to have the technical tools in place that we have now, such as very good 
groundwater and surface water monitoring data sets and a fairly refined groundwater model, so that 
you can tell people, you can scenario test". This sentiment was echoed by some local groundwater 
managers as well. As one groundwater district manager commented, communicating information about 
the aquifer decline was challenging at first, but as farmers learned more, they started to help others 
understand as well: 
I think the more times that you talk to people about it then it starts to become clearer to them… I think 
those that understand it more are looking at the numbers for the first year. They’ve come a lot closer to 
where they are supposed to be, or outright made their obligation. Those people are helpful too, because 
then like he was saying before, it’s really a grassroots system right now. They’ll turn around, the more I 
understand it the more I talk to my neighbour, I help my neighbour understand it. 
As this groundwater district manager demonstrates, the distribution of scientific and technical 
knowledge has helped groundwater district members recognise the problem. Even further, as 
individuals have learned more, they’ve started helping others by explaining the aquifer decline, which 
has legitimised the settlement agreement in the eyes of many. 
In providing the technical tools that the above specialist discusses, scientific knowledge was 
distributed to farmers, rather than just to water managers. This is one way in which this agreement 
represents a move towards adaptive governance along the ESPA. Susskind advocates the distribution of 
scientific and technical knowledge by locally selected experts, and the distribution of this knowledge to 
all affected stakeholders. In the case of the agreement, however, the experts providing technical and 
scientific knowledge were representatives of IDWR, rather than locally selected experts, and the 
information was primarily distributed to groundwater district managers. 
The involvement of IDWR and the redistribution of scientific and technical knowledge to local 
groundwater district managers also led to a recognition that it was no longer possible or sustainable to 
continue to purchase water for mitigation – a strategy that had been used to mitigate water shortages 
prior to the agreement. Given the possibility that 300,000 acres of irrigated agriculture could be 
curtailed without mitigation, the groundwater district managers recognised that the problem was much 
more severe than in the past and that there was no way to mitigate water shortfalls for so many acres. 
As one groundwater district manager said: 
I think people realized that, you know what, we need to get to a point where we’re actually, instead of just 
buying water out of the river every year to mitigate an issue, come up with some solutions that would 
actually change what’s going on with the aquifer. 
Given the challenges of mitigation and the data from the aquifer models, groundwater district 
managers and the IGWA president accepted the necessity of signing the 2015 Settlement Agreement 
and implementing governance changes. 
Resolution by neutral parties 
Susskind argues that, in order for governance to be adaptive, any resolution that is reached between 
parties must be negotiated and resolved by impartial parties. In this section, we explore the role of 
mediators in the agreement negotiation process. We argue that, while the mediators of the 
negotiations are not truly 'neutral', they are as close to impartial as possible given the circumstances 
and institutional knowledge needed to negotiate an agreement like this. 
During interviews with local and state water managers, respondents regularly identified two key 
actors from the state legislature who helped successfully negotiate the terms of the 2015 agreement. 
Both had been involved in agriculture or ranching in the state, had knowledge of water law, and 
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believed strongly in the importance of agriculture to Idaho’s economy and culture. Many groundwater 
managers who were present at the negotiations explained that the history of conflict between water 
users involved in the negotiations meant that the presence of outside parties was required at the 
negotiations to mitigate tensions between the two parties, and that these two legislators did a great 
deal of the legwork to ensure that an agreement was reached. As one member of IDWR said, 
Between April of 2015 to when it got inked in September, I will say there was between 15 and 20 meetings 
between the parties. They were really ragged at the beginning. It had to be shuttle diplomacy. They were in 
their separate rooms and we would go back and forth. They could not be in the same room with each 
other. 
During the negotiations, 'shuttle diplomacy' was conducted by the two members of the state legislature 
who were heavily involved. They would hear complaints and demands from either the SWC or IGWA, 
and then go to the other party and hear the same thing, until they were able to collectively work out an 
agreement that was acceptable to all parties, including the state. 
Scholars of adaptive governance (Scholz and Stiftel, 2005; Susskind, 2005) argue that neutral 
facilitators ensure fair and reasonable governance outcomes. The two state legislators involved in the 
2015 agreement negotiations were neutral in the sense that neither of them is currently affiliated with 
the SWC or IGWA. However, both have historically been involved in farming and ranching in Idaho, and, 
as state legislators, both also have a vested interest in ensuring the ongoing economic success of 
agriculture in Idaho. While this perhaps belies their neutrality, in this case, the institutional knowledge 
from their background in agriculture was necessary in order to understand the complexities of the 
state’s water issues well enough to effectively facilitate and mediate the negotiations. Thus, even 
though these two state legislators do not exactly meet Susskind’s definition of what constitutes a truly 
'neutral' facilitator, in this context mediators with knowledge of the system were necessary, and 
despite their vested interests, their legitimacy was valued by stakeholders enough to ensure that an 
agreement was reached. Our results thus suggest that neutral facilitation is not necessarily a 
requirement of effective adaptive governance, inviting reassessment of Susskind’s framework. We find 
instead that credibility, legitimacy, and a strong knowledge of the resource system may be equally (or 
even more) important attributes than neutrality. Future research should continue to examine the most 
important attributes facilitators should possess. 
While allowing mediation from parties with institutional knowledge may have been necessary in this 
situation, some of the stakeholders did have objections to how these individuals influenced the 
outcome of the agreement. In particular, local groundwater managers noted that, because the state 
was involved in the negotiations, it was able to retain a substantial amount of centralised authority for 
itself. As Pahl-Wostl and Knieper (2014) have described, systems with multiple sites of authority can 
lead to a fragmented governance system, where some authority is recognised, but other authority is 
too diffuse to be exercised, or is made secondary to the central authority if there is conflict with 
implementation and enforcement policies. In this way, fragmentation may also lead to greater 
frustration, as some groundwater district managers expressed to us in their interviews. 
The negotiation process itself offered an opportunity for the state to re-emphasise its own authority 
with regard to water management. While prior appropriation has traditionally been perceived by 
farmers and other water rights users as a decentralised management strategy that emphasises private 
property rights (Anderson et al., 2016), prior appropriation is actually a centralised strategy that 
ensures that a single governing body can administer and manage water rights in a state (Harrington, 
2012). However, because prior appropriation has been perceived as a decentralised strategy, the 
negotiation process was read by many stakeholders as the state reasserting its authority to govern 
water, and in doing so, becoming more visible in the water management process. As one groundwater 
manager indicated, "We’re worried about it, because if this agreement does not turn out, then we will 
be under a water management area, and having the state dictate that you all cut back (…) to 20%, we’re 
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worried about that". While many local water managers acknowledged the role of the state (particularly 
state judges) in ruling on past litigation, they see the negotiation process and the subsequent 
agreement as a way for the state to reassert its authority over water management. As Scott (1998) and 
Birkenholtz (2012, 2014) have noted, institutional change involves the process of making various actors 
more visible either to, or as, leaders of policy processes, which is often rejected or contested by others 
involved in the process of change. While Scott (1998) originally argued that institutional change, 
particularly when it comes to changes to the centralisation of government, is a process of rendering 
individual subjects more visible or knowable to the government, and thus subject to being governed, 
Birkenholtz (2014) extrapolates this argument to indicate that institutional change is also the process of 
rendering the state more visible to its constituents via concentration of authority, thus establishing or 
reclaiming control. 
Despite these questions about the relative pre-eminence of the state versus the groundwater 
districts' authority, however, the state’s involvement in the agreement was generally viewed positively 
because the state demonstrated commitment to the agreement by taking on its own aquifer recharge 
obligations. Of the twelve groundwater district managers we interviewed, seven viewed the state’s 
involvement positively. This suggests that, even though the state was not truly a neutral negotiator, and 
many water managers saw the negotiations and subsequent agreement as a way for the state to 
reassert its authority, they nevertheless grudgingly acknowledged the value of the state’s involvement. 
Specifically, as part of the agreement, the state legislature allotted money to the Idaho Water Resource 
Board, a subset of IDWR, to recharge up to 250,000 AF per year, as available. One IWRB member told us 
they had allocated US$5 million a year for that effort, which was widely seen as an acknowledgement 
by the state that it had over-distributed water rights in the past and was recognising its responsibility to 
help fix the current problem. This awareness of its own mistakes in not managing water more frugally in 
the past likely helped the state representatives build trust with the other stakeholders and generally 
soften any frustration they may have felt about the state’s active involvement in the agreement. 
Defining and resolving disagreement through natural experimentation and collaborative 
monitoring 
Susskind’s final metric of adaptive governance is the opportunity to define and resolve disagreement 
through natural experimentation and collaborative monitoring. Both during the negotiations and since 
implementation has commenced, areas of disagreement continue to be defined. Natural 
experimentation and collaborative monitoring, however, have only occurred since implementation of 
the agreement began, which has led to additional scepticism of the science and monitoring of the ESPA. 
While some groundwater district managers argued that the agreement could only have been 
negotiated with the help of the aquifer models developed by IDWR, others expressed scepticism about 
the science that produced the models. Perhaps because the scientific and technical experts were not 
selected by stakeholders, or perhaps because of a general distrust of IDWR as a centralised government 
authority, five out of the twelve groundwater district managers indicated distrust towards the aquifer 
model data and the conclusion that groundwater users were at fault for the aquifer’s decline. This 
creates a substantial problem for groundwater district managers attempting to address concerns and 
entice individual farmers to cooperate. As the following quote from a groundwater district manager – 
representative of many farmers' perspectives – illustrates, some farmers affected by the agreement do 
not believe there is sufficient data to warrant its terms: 
Those guys are scrambling around saying that it’s our – it’s the groundwater users that are perpetrating 
their losses. And that may be true within five miles maybe of the river, but it’s not in other places. All they 
have is the groundwater model. They really don’t have any testing. They have years where they can say, 
well, the water table has dropped for the last 50 years. They can say that. But where did they measure that 
at? That’s the problem. If they measured it right next to the river and there was gains in farming right next 
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to the river, it’s probably accurate. But it’s not accurate basin wide. That’s the problem. And so they are 
trying to build a model off of insufficient data. 
As the quote above also demonstrates, there is no consensus among stakeholders when it comes to the 
decline of the ESPA. Susskind argues that defining areas of disagreement is fundamental to ensuring 
adaptive governance. Thus, in the case of the 2015 agreement, the lack of locally selected technical and 
scientific experts may be an important problem, and demonstrates one of the ways in which the 
agreement fails to meet the necessary criteria for genuine adaptive governance. However, it is 
important to note that in cases where there is little to no local expertise because the issue at hand is 
highly technical, the absence of local knowledge may not be as important as the need to design 
governance arrangements in such a way that local managers become experts over time. 
As part of the settlement agreement, all groundwater wells in the affected groundwater districts in 
the ESPA are required to be metered by the beginning of the 2018 irrigation season. By metering wells, 
local groundwater district managers will have better information about the water use of farmers in 
their districts, and can communicate this use to the state. From this data, IDWR will develop additional 
models that examine how the 13% reduction and additional recharge that the districts and IWRB have 
engaged in are affecting ESPA water levels. While the metering of groundwater wells is considered a 
better-late-than-never strategy, many groundwater district managers have argued that the metering 
should have preceded the agreement itself. By only requiring well meters after the agreement goes into 
effect, some groundwater district managers argued that there was no way to ensure that the 
groundwater pumping itself was what was causing the aquifer decline. Additionally, while IDWR argued 
for the 13% reduction in pumping as a way to return to aquifer levels similar to those of the 2000s, 
groundwater district managers argue that it is hard to know how well the 13% reduction will work. In 
combination with the natural recharge from the 2016/2017 winter, groundwater district managers have 
argued that it will be very difficult to determine how effective the reductions are compared to wet 
winters overall. Several groundwater district managers expressed concern that the aquifer will rise, and 
that if it does it will not be the result of changes to groundwater pumping but rather will be the result 
of wet winters: 
Do I think that pumpers have an effect on the aquifer, yes. I don’t think that we have near the effect that 
the surface water coalition has propagated. I think that when we get to 2020 and they measure those 
sentinel wells, I think that we will have a better argument as pumpers. Because if we have done everything 
that they called for, plus this last winter, holy crap, and if those wells still are reacting, I think we will have a 
standoff. 
Given that no natural experiments were conducted prior to the implementation of the agreement, 
groundwater district managers are expressing frustration at the mandates, even while they do want to 
positively affect the aquifer. In the following section, we consider how the governance arrangements 
put in place by the settlement agreement affect its implementation. 
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 
Manager preparedness 
While the final round of negotiations that led to the 2015 agreement was catalysed by a low snowpack 
and predictions of a dry year, farmers and water managers along the ESPA had been amending water 
management in the area for decades prior. As a result, from a broad perspective, one would expect that 
state and local water managers would be prepared to carry out new changes. As local groundwater 
managers argued, however, they and their constituents were not prepared for the changes to water 
management and the redistribution of authority that accompanied it, particularly the decentralisation 
of authority from the state that rendered the groundwater districts more powerful. The agreement 
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stipulated that groundwater district boards, which had started forming in Idaho after conjunctive 
management was mandated in 1994, were allowed to decide how the required reductions to 
groundwater irrigation should be distributed among the members of their district. Overall, this change 
was positively received, as local governance has long been valued in the American West among 
resource managers and users who generally support local decision-making authority (Anderson et al., 
2017). While groundwater district managers have indicated that the delegation of decision-making 
authority to the local level is a key reason for the likely 2015 agreement, it has also created some new 
challenges for groundwater districts. 
One major challenge expressed by groundwater district managers was that many of the districts did 
not have paid staff and a professionalised central office that could effectively communicate the new 
policy changes and the implementation options available to members. Relatedly, most districts did not 
have an established process to address and mediate members' objections. Further, because of the way 
the hydrology of the ESPA had been understood in the past, the three groundwater districts northeast 
of American Falls had never experienced curtailment orders. As a result, these groundwater district 
managers lacked institutional knowledge when it came to understanding the hydrological system, the 
complexities of water law, and the diversity of management options that were available to meet their 
required cuts. As this groundwater district manager noted, 
The district boards were super overwhelmed and so they kind of did, they would throw this thing out, 
everybody’s going to just take the 12.6% cut. Then everybody would go, no we’re not. There’s got to be a 
different way. And then this water in to it from the canals, that made a big difference. But the boards were 
just, I mean they were used to meeting once a month for an hour and then say, yeah let’s do this, and go 
on their merry way. They had no idea of water delivery systems. They really had no idea of any kind of 
historic water law. They’re just volunteers that have just gone, oh okay, I will sit on this board. 
The decentralisation of implementation authority did not just create implementation problems. Indeed, 
in some cases, it facilitated implementation by allowing water managers to address fairness concerns 
held by farmers. Here, while all districts were required to reduce groundwater use by 13% overall, 
district managers could choose different ways to distribute these cuts. Most chose a tiered system in 
which farmers had to cut their groundwater use by a certain percentage depending on the seniority of 
their water right. Other districtsʼ management choices were based on historical use patterns, and 
mandated that farmers with higher historic use must reduce more, while users who had already 
increased their efficiencies would be expected to reduce less. This type of flexibility helped address 
fairness concerns among farmers with strong beliefs in the inviolability of prior appropriation, while 
also maintaining the values of decentralisation that permeated the farming community in the state 
prior to the agreement (Wester et al., 2011; Birkenholtz, 2012, 2014). 
Flexibility in management decision making was also necessary because of differences across the 
eight districts in terms of hydrogeology, climate, and soil. All of these differences at the district level 
meant that a 'one size fits all' solution would be likely to fail and/or be unfair to many farmers. Thus, 
the added flexibility at the local level demonstrates one of the ways in which the settlement agreement 
aligns more closely with adaptive governance principles than have previous governance strategies in 
Idaho. This built-in flexibility also suggests that Idaho’s policymakers intuited that the implementation 
of new policies is more likely to succeed if affected communities are offered more local decision-making 
authority and opportunities to adapt management changes to local conditions (Childs et al., 2013; Scott 
et al., 2013; Risvoll et al., 2014). The lack of preparedness among some groundwater district managers 
also indicates how dissimilar the prior system had been, and how many changes are needed before 
successful adaptive governance in the ESPA can be realised, including the development of specialised 
knowledge in water management, identification of options for farming with less water, and building a 
cohesive district office to handle implementation. 
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Enforcement authority 
One of the major challenges to implementation of the 2015 agreement that groundwater district 
managers highlight is that their authority only goes as far as telling farmers what they can and cannot 
do to meet the terms of the agreement – fundamentally, they have no enforcement power. If a given 
farmer chooses not to comply with the terms of the agreement, the district itself would not be able to 
force that farmer to comply. As one groundwater district manager describes below, the belief among 
many groundwater district managers is that the agreement neither centralises nor decentralises 
enforcement authority, and instead creates an absence of enforcement authority. He told us that if 
farmers do not comply: 
They’re going to figure it out with the state. But the state, I know what they’re going to do. They’re just 
going to throw them right back in our district and say 'you guys take care of it'. I know how that works. 
We’ve been down this road before. It’s true, that’s what happens. 
Groundwater districts do have authority to exclude uncooperative farmers from their districts, which 
would make those farmers subject to curtailment in a dry year. However, as the groundwater manager 
quoted above indicated, the state would likely refuse that action as a solution and instead ask the 
groundwater district to find another consequence. This fuzziness in specific enforcement authority 
reveals one of the primary weaknesses of the agreement: under its current terms, farmers are expected 
to comply out of goodwill, with few fail-safes in place. 
Susskind does not define how preparedness of stakeholders and the distribution of decision-making 
authority should intersect, and adaptive governance as a framework does not clearly define how 
enforcement authority should be distributed in order to ensure flexible and sustainable social and 
ecological resource governance. Our interviews with water managers at state and local levels in Idaho 
indicate that, while authority has been decentralised to the groundwater district managers as far as 
implementation is concerned, the preparedness of these managers to take management actions was 
frequently lacking, particularly given the disparity in institutional knowledge among the districts. While 
preparedness may come in many forms, the assumption of additional administrative and 
implementation responsibilities, along with the task of acquiring additional knowledge, demonstrates 
the difficulty of preparing stakeholders to achieve the goals of policy solutions developed through 
adaptive governance. In the case of Idaho, the state’s active involvement and acceptance of 
institutional responsibility for facilitating the agreement’s goals seems promising. Overall, however, the 
vacuum of enforcement authority is a potential problem with both Idaho’s 2015 Settlement Agreement 
and with the adaptive governance framework. 
CONCLUSION 
The 2015 agreement offers a unique and ongoing opportunity to understand how novel governance 
arrangements and the policy solutions that arise from them unfold over time. The agreement was not 
written to adhere to adaptive governance principles, yet it includes elements of both adaptive 
governance and management. Based on our analysis, by adopting principles of adaptive governance, 
institutional change at the state and local level was enabled, building social and ecological flexibility 
into the governance system as it moves forward. This social and ecological flexibility, which is 
considered a main goal of adaptive governance, is generally considered a benefit because it allows for 
better outcomes, including sustainability. However, as our case shows, adaptive governance is not a 
panacea for resource management or governance. As others have shown in studies of decentralised 
governance (Andersson and Ostrom, 2008; Hoogesteger, 2012; Dunn et al., 2014; Boelens et al., 2015), 
changes to the distribution of authority can also create vacuums of authority. Along the ESPA, there is 
little enforcement authority in place that allows for groundwater districts to ensure farmers meet their 
required water cuts. Adaptive governance has little to say about the troubles of re-distributing 
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authority, largely arguing that movement away from bureaucracy and toward adaptive governance is a 
benefit (Susskind, 2005) without considering how this movement affects local resource managers' 
capacity to implement policy. 
The 2015 Settlement Agreement is an ongoing process. Water managers will once again meet at the 
end of the 2018 irrigation season to assess how the levels of the ESPA are doing. While there are many 
groundwater district managers who argue that reducing pumping is not going to be the solution to 
aquifer decline, and that the wet winter of 2016/2017 will recharge the aquifer in a way that pumping 
reductions alone could not accomplish, the reassessment of the aquifer also provides an opportunity to 
renegotiate other parts of the agreement. Given that the goals of the agreement are assessed annually 
and that there is room for renegotiation starting in 2020, there are also opportunities for elements of 
adaptive governance to be strengthened, and to ensure that there is, among other changes, greater 
stakeholder preparation and participation. We suggest that, while adaptive governance cannot be 
considered the panacea of resource management solutions, the terms of the settlement agreement and 
the opportunities to reassess the agreement provide opportunities for social and ecological flexibility 
that are well-regarded by stakeholders. As a result, this case offers the opportunity to continue to 
evaluate adaptive governance and examine the degree to which it does contribute to better 
groundwater outcomes. 
Finally, this case shows the range of actors, interests, and networks that are mobilised in changing 
governance. While these stakeholders had differing degrees of preparedness and knowledge, the 
knowledge that IDWR was able to provide, even if it was not always trusted, was an important part of 
the settlement negotiation and the changes to governance it produced. We show that, at least in Idaho, 
a range of actors must be mobilised in order to change and establish new state groundwater policies. 
Even with a process that is more participatory than most, this case shows that there are still limits to 
state power that prevail in areas where decentralisation is a value and centralisation of authority at the 
state level is seen as an imposition. In spite of these circumstances, water managers at various levels of 
governance were able to negotiate an agreement that has been implemented by a diverse group of 
stakeholders. While we do not wish to idealise this case, the establishment of the 2015 Settlement 
Agreement and the elements of adaptive governance that emerged organically in the process, 
nevertheless support a certain optimism for a collaborative approach to governing groundwater and 
preventing groundwater overexploitation in the future. 
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